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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS: EXPERIENCE UNDER
THE UNIFORM ACT
LAURANCE M. HYDEt
Missouri wisely took a long forward step in 1935 by adopting
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.1 This is one of the
statutes drawn by the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws.
It is to be hoped that the value of this act will serve to call to
the attention of the Missouri Legislature other progressive and
needed modern legislation drafted by this capable national or-
ganization. It has been pointed out by Justice Stone of the
United States Supreme Court, in a recent article2 that, in the
case of any new statute, "the success of the remedy must depend
in large measure upon the willingness of the judges to make use
of it." It might be added that it also depends upon the vision
and foresight of lawyers to find its full usefulness. Although our
act has been in force only about five years, many cases under it
have already reached our Supreme Court. A review of some of
these cases, together with the historical background of the uni-
form act and its use in other states, may therefore be helpful at
this time. The Missouri act is now Article 14, of Chapter 6 of
the Revised Statutes of 19393, and therefore has become a part
of our general Code of Civil Procedure.
I. HISTORY OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Although the land of its origin seems to have been Scotland
(where it was perhaps evolved from Roman legal sources), ex-
tensive use of the declaratory judgment in modern times was
developed in England. It was there first authorized in Chancery,
by a statute enacted in 1852.4 Its adoption had been advocated
long before by Lord Brougham in his famous law reform speech,
of February 7, 1828, in the House of Commons., It was widely
t Commissioner, Missouri Supreme Court; Member of Council of the
Section of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association; Director,
American Judicature Society.
1. Mo. *Laws of 1935, 218.
2. Stone, The Common Law in the United States (1936) 50 Harm. L.
Rev. 4, 8.
3. R. S. Mo. (1939) Secs. 1126-1130.
4. (1852) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86.
5. Holdsworth, The Movement for Reform in the Law, 1793-1832 (1940)
56 Law Q. Rev. 33 and 208.
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extended in England through use of the rule-making power,
granted by the judicature acts., An English court has said of
its development: "The action of declarator has existed for hun-
dreds of years in Scotland" (anything used so long in Scotland
must be worth what it costs) ; and "the rules which have been
elucidated by a long course of decisions in the Scottish courts
may be summarized thus: The question must be a real and not
a theoretical question; the person raising it must have a real
interest to raise it; he must be able to secure a proper contra-
dicter-that is to say, someone presently existing, who has a
true interest to oppose the declaration sought."7 Our own courts
have for a long time rendered what were really declaratory judg-
ments in limited classes of cases "such as in the construction of
wills, instructions as to the management of estates and trusts,
bills of interpleader so far as the stakeholder is concerned, ac-
tions to quiet or remove cloud from title, cases stated to pass
on the marketability of title to real estate, adjudication of
boundaries between states, review of judgments of the Court of
Claims, and naturalization proceedings." 8 However, the broaden-
ing of the field by statute seems to have begun about 1919 in
Florida, Michigan and Wisconsin. Thereafter, in 1922, came the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, now adopted in at least
half the states, including Missouri. The Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, upon the same model," was adopted in 1934.
An interesting item in Missouri procedural history is the fact
that when our present code was adopted, in 1848, it contained
a provision"0 which in effect provided for a declaratory judgment
upon any agreed statement of facts. An explanation of this pro-
vision made at the time of its adoption states:
It not infrequently happens, that in a contemplated law-
suit, the facts are either not disputed or can be agreed upon;
and that the only questions which remain between the par-
ties are questions of law. The provisions of this article will
enable parties thus situated to obtain an adjudication of the
case without most of the expense and vexation usually at-
tending law-suits, and in much less time; and in a manner
6. (1873) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; (1875) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77.
7. Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. British Bank (1921) 90
L. J. K. B. N. S. 1089, 19 A. L. R. 1101, 1106.
8. 16 Am. Jur. 276.
9. (1934) 48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 400.
10. Now R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1263.
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much more agreeable to the feelings of honest men who
dislike contentions with their neighbors. Actions at law are
intended to compel people to do that which is right and just;
here we propose a way by which it may be done by consent.
The affidavit (as to truth of facts) is necessary to prevent
our courts of justice being turned into moot courts; or, what
is worse, their being required to decide points of law in a
case where one of the parties, or both, are unreal; and the
decision is afterwards to be used in a cause between real
parties litigant.n
It seems remarkable that Missouri lawyers did not make more
use of the opportunities for relief, in the nature of declaratory
judgment, which this section was intended to afford. Agreement
upon facts is not unusual, but an agreed statement of facts is
distinguished from an agreed case under Section 1263. It has
been held that, although the facts may be agreed upon, in whole
or in part, in an ordinary case "the pleadings are left to perform
their usual functions," and "the agreed statement 'stands in lieu
of a special verdict.' -2 Perhaps the only case reaching our
Supreme Court which clearly shows it was brought under the
method provided by Section 1263 is Joplin Waterworks Co. v.
Jasper County."3 This waterworks case involved the right of
Jasper County (also the Joplin School District) to tax the com-
pany's main water purifying plant, supply lines and distribution
system, located therein, when its source of water and pumping
station was located in Newton County. It was contended on ap-
peal that "the controversy submitted by the parties to the agreed
case is collusive and pretended, and not actual and real, and
therefore the agreed case presents merely a moot or abstract
question of law."''
The Supreme Court's ruling, which would certainly be applica-
ble to declaratory judgment cases, was as follows:
The determinative factor is whether the proceeding pre-
sents an actual controversy involving adverse interests be-
tween the parties. * * * Although the proceeding under
review is an amicable one, in the sense that the parties have
11. Wells, Law Reforms, Pleading and Practice (1849) 59.
12. Byers v. Essex Inv. Co. (1920) 281 Mo. 375, 219 S. W. 570. See also
Stanberry v. Jordan (1898) 145 Mo. 371, 46 S. W. 1093; Munford v. Wilson(1852) 15 Mo. 540.
13. (1931) 327 Mo. 964, 38 S. W. (2d) 1068.
14. Ibid. 38 S. W. (2d) at 1075.
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agreed upon the facts upon which the controversy depends,
and have dispensed with the delay, expense, and technical
forms of procedure which are incident to a formal action, by
the submission of an agreed case, as authorized by the
statute, supra, yet we are inclined to the view that the con-
troversy submitted for decision and judgment herein is real
and actual, involving the exercise by the respondents of an
asserted right which is disputed by the appellant, and that
the interests of the appellant, on the one hand, and of the
respondents, on the other hand, are adverse.15
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The first decision on constitutionality of declaratory judgments
was in Michigan.16 In that case, the first Michigan statute was
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it required the per-
formance of functions which were not judicial and which were
not within any recognized judicial power. The court took the
view that the purpose was "to make the courts the legal advisers
of everybody," on moot questions. It cited the refusal of the
United States Supreme Court in 1793 to give advisory opinions
"by declaring their opinions on questions not growing out of the
case before them," requested by President Washington through
Mr. Jefferson, his Secretary of State.'17 This Michigan test case
unfortunately presented a situation in which, as stated in the
dissenting opinion (on the ground that the case presented was
not within the Declaratory Judgment Act), the plaintiff could
not show "an actual concrete controversy, a bona fide contest,
over asserted existing legal rights, between him and the de-
fendant." The majority opinion in this Michigan case proceeded
on the theory that the act was intended to include such situations.
Another statute was enacted in Michigan, in 1929, which spe-
cifically provided that it applied only to "cases of actual con-
troversies" and that the declarations of rights under it should
"have the effect of final judgments."' s This act was held to be
constitutional in a case involving the right of a lessee, under a
99-year lease of a theatre, to demolish the building and erect a
new one to be used for other purposes; the lessor claiming this
15. Ibid. 38 S. W. (2d) at 1075, 1076.
16. Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. (1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350,
12 A. L. R. 26.
17. See recent comment on this incident in separate concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. Miller (1939) 307 U. S. 433, 460.
18. Mich. Laws of 1929, No. 36.
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would give him the right to forfeit the lease.19 This case, and
others which have passed upon the constitutionality of Declara-
tory Judgments Acts, cited and relied upon State ex rel. Hopins
v. Grove." In the Grove case, upholding the constitutionality of
the Kansas Declaratory Judgment Act, it was said:
It is hardly conceivable that any fundamental principle of
our government, beyond legislative control, prevents two
disputants, each of whom sincerely believes in the rightful-
ness of his own claim, but each of whom wishes to abide by
the law, whatever it may be determined to be, from obtain-
ing an adjudication of their controversy in the courts with-
out one or the other first doing something that is illegal.21
It would seem that all question as to constitutionality of acts
providing the relief of declaratory judgment, and especially of
the uniform act, has been finally settled by two recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1933, the Court
considered the uniform act adopted in Tennessee, upon the con-
tention that a declaratory judgment thereunder did not present
"a case or controversy" to which the judicial power of the Court
extended under Section 2 of Article 3 of the Constitution of the
United States.22 The Court held against this contention, took
jurisdiction (in the case of a taxpayer seeking a judicial declara-
tion that a state excise tax on storage of gasoline was invalid
under the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment) and said
that "changes merely in the form or method of procedure by
which federal rights are brought to final adjudication in the
state courts are not enough to preclude review of the adjudica-
tion by this Court, so long as the case retains the essentials of an
adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, con-
troversy, which is finally determined by the judgment below." 23
The Court further held that "obviously the appellant, whose duty
to pay the tax will be determined by the decision of this case, is
not attempting to secure an abstract determination by the Court
-of the validity of a statute * *, or a decision advising what
the law would be on an uncertain or hypothetical state of facts,' 24
19. Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore (1930) 249 Mich. 673, 229
N. W. 618, 68 A. L. R. 106.
20. (1921) 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82, 19 A. L. R. 1116.
21. Ibid. 201 Pac. at 84.
22. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace (1933) 288 U. S. 249.
23. Id. at 264.
24. Id. at 262.
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and that "while the ordinary course of judicial procedure re-
sults in a judgment requiring an award of process or execution
to carry it into effect, such relief is not an indispensable adjunct
to the exercise of the judicial function. ' 25 In 1937, the Court
followed this decision, and other precedents, to uphold the valid-
ity of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934,26 in Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth." The court said that the act of 1934,
"in its limitation to 'cases of actual controversy,' manifestly has
regard to the constitutional provision and is operative only in
respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional
sense."
28
III. NATURE OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
A. Legal or equitable
It has been said that declaratory judgment proceedings are
equitable in nature.29 The Missouri Supreme Court has held that
"relief by declaratory judgment is sui generis, and while not
strictly legal or equitable, yets its historical affinity is equita-
ble." ,," This equitable background is shown in Sec. 1120, R. S. Mo.
(1939) covering relations of trustee and cestui qui trust, which
is one of the first situations out of which declaratory judgments
developed. However, it is also to be noted that this section spe-
cifically broadens the right to have such declarations include
many kinds of fiduciaries such as executors, guardians and
others mentioned, in situations which were not reached in equity.
The act clearly includes many situations heretofore cognizable
only in actions at law. It has, therefore, been suggested that
"the statute providing for declaratory judgments may be re-
garded as a step toward the obliteration of the line which has
heretofore separated law from equity."31 This would seem to be
particularly true under our uniform act which authorizes
"further relief * * * whenever necessary or proper," and which
also provides that a fact issue "may be tried and determined in
the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in
25. Id. at 263.
26. (1934) 48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 400.
27. (1937) 300 U. S. 227.
28. Id. at 239.
29. Manchester v. Townshend (1937) 109 Vt. 65, 192 Atl. 22, 110 A. L.
R. 811.
30. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones (1939) 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d)
945, 954.
31. 16 Am. Jur. 289.
1941]
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other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pend-
ing." The equity rule as to costs also is established by the
act.33 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones34 held that a declaratory
judgment action could be heard with a cross action for affirma-
tive equitable relief, and separate questions raised in each were
decided. Considering it as an equitable proceeding raises inter-
esting questions as to scope of appellate review, especially as to
what extent the appellate court is bound by fact findings in the
trial court.35
B. Real controversy or advisory opinion.
One thing is certainly now settled, and that is that a declara-
tory judgment is neither an advisory opinion nor a decision of
a moot question, because it must involve a real controversy in
which the result would be res Judicat between the parties.8 0
Courts sometimes inadvertently decide moot questions inciden-
tally in the course of an opinion. However, these parts of an
opinion are classed as obiter dictum, and such declarations are
not binding as precedents. An advisory opinion would be in the
same class and could be binding on no one. Therefore, the pro-
ceeding must be between actual parties to an actual transaction
who disagree about their rights or obligations with regard to it.
As said in a leading English case, "it does not extend to enable
any stranger to the transaction to go and ask the court to ex-
press its opinion in order to help him in other transactions." 3
Of course, it could not extend either to enable the parties to seek
advice about a merely contemplated transaction 88 Apparently
this kind of case (at least as between the original parties thereto,
as stated in the dissenting opinion) confused the Michigan Su-
preme Court, when it declared the first Michigan Act uncon-
stitutional.3 9 As recently pointed out in the United States Su-
32. R. S. Mo. (1939) sees. 1133-1134.
33. R. S. Mo. (1939) see. 1135.
34. (1939) 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d) 945.
35. See Part VI hereof.
36. See Annotations: (1920) 12 A. L. R. 52; (1921) 19 A. L. R. 1124;
(1926) 50 A. L. R. 42; (1930) 68 A. L. R. 110; (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1205;
(1935) 101 A. L. R. 689.
37. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co. (1915) 2 K. B. 536, 12 A. L.
R. 1.
38. Heller v. Shapiro (1932) 208 Wis. 310, 242 N. W. 174, 87 A. L. R.
1201.
39. Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. (1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350,
12 A. L. R. 26, 51.
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preme Court, it is not the exercise of judicial power, "to write
legal essays or to give advisory legal opinions" (law reviews
will afford opportunities for such mental exercise) ; that prop-
erly "a judge never gives a decision until the facts necessary for
that decision have arisen ;" and that courts should not do so be-
cause "the imagination of judges, like that of other persons, is
limited, and they are not able to put before their minds all the
complex circumstances which they ought have in their minds
when giving a decision."' 40 This is just as true of declaratory
judgment cases as of all others. In accordance with this view it
was held by the Missouri Supreme Court in Vincent Realty Co.
v. Brown,41 that the effect of Section 4598a42, providing a lien
for taxes in case of a sale, gift or transfer of all or a major
portion of a company's assets, could not be determined in a case
in which no such transfer had been made, and "there is no alle-
gation therein from which it may be inferred that there is even
a remote possibility of plaintiffs' selling or giving away the whole
or major part of their assets." In short, no claim of lien had
been made in the situation shown. A recent case on the other
side of the line is Currin v. Wallace43 in which the United States
Supreme Court held there was an actual controversy. In that
case, the Secretary of Agriculture, acting under the Tobacco
Inspection Act of 1935,44 promulgated regulations concerning the
marketing of tobacco, on the theory that it was part of inter-
state commerce. Tobacco warehousemen and auctioneers sought
a declaration against the Secretary that offering tobacco for
sale at auction on the warehouse floor was not a transaction in
interstate commerce and that the Tobacco Inspection Act was
therefore unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court
held that this case presented an actual controversy.
C. Procedural only in nature.
The United States Supreme Court said that "the operation
of the (Federal) Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only;"
40. Separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Coleman
v. Miller (1939) 307 U. S. 433, 460. See also Oldham County v. Arvin
(1932) 244 Ky. 551, 51 S. W. (2d) 657; Vincent Realty Co. v. Brown (1939)
344 Mo. 438, 126 S. W. (2d) 1162; Heller v. Shapiro (1932) 208 Wis. 310,
242 N. W. 174, 87 A. L. R. 1201.
41. (1939) 344 Mo. 438, 126 S. W. (2d) 1162, 1163.
42. Mo. Laws of 1937, 208.
43. (1939) 306 U. S. 1.
44. 48 Stat. 731, 7 U. S. C. A. (1939) sec. 511-511q.
19411
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that "the Congress is not confined to traditional forms or tradi-
tional remedies" in exercising its power over the jurisdiction of
the federal courts; and that "in dealing with methods within its
sphere of remedial action the Congress may create and improve
as well as abolish or restrict."45 This view as to procedural effect
has also been taken in England.6 This view would seem to have
a precedent in our rule as to the remedy of quiet title which may
be legal or equitable according to the issues raised by the plead-
ings.47 It is also significant that, in the 1939 revision of our
statutes, the Declaratory Judgments Act was placed in and made
a part of our general code of civil procedure. Thus it seems logi-
cal to consider the remedy of declaratory judgment, not as a new
kind of controversy or cause of action, but as an improved
remedy for reaching and determining usual controversies or
causes at an earlier stage of their development than was possible
under "traditional forms" of the common law or other forms
heretofore provided by our statutes.
IV. SCOPE OF REMEDY
A. Matters in which it nay be used.
Section 1 of the Declaratory Judgment Act 8 authorizes courts
"to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed." This is, of course, a
general statement intended to cover the whole field. Sections 2,
3, and 4, of the act 49enumerate specific situations in which decla-
rations may be obtained., However, Section 5"0 specifically pro-
vides: "The enumeration in Sections 2, 3, and 4 does not limit or
restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in Section
1, in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which
a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove
an uncertainty." Thus the courts are given wide latitude to
apply this procedure and grant declaratory relief in situations
where future circumstances show it to be required. Its use for
45. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth (1937) 300 U. S. 227, 240 (italics
supplied).
46. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co. (1915) 2 K. B. 536, 12 A. L.
R. 1.
47. Kimberlin v. Roberts (1937) 341 Mo. 267, 107 S. W. (2d) 24; Staf-
ford v. Shinabarger (1935) 336 Mo. 856, 81 S. W. (2d) 626; Williams v.
Walker (1933) 333 Mo. 322, 62 S. W. (2d) 840.
48. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1126.
49. Id. at sees. 1127, 1128, 1129.
50. Id. at sec. 1130.
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construction of rights under provisions of insurance policies,
even before due and payable, is illustrated by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth.5 1 It
already has been used in many states to determine the validity of
marriages and divorces and the legitimacy of children as affect-
ing status, and property rights.2
It is to be expected that most of the first cases to be brought
under our act would be under the specifically enumerated situa-
tions. Cases where "rights, status or other legal relations are
(or were claimed to be) affected by a statute," seeking to "have
determined (a) question of construction or validity," (provided
for in Section 2) were among the first to reach the Missouri
Supreme Court. One of the first of these was St. Louis v. Smith.5 3
A declaration was asked as to the liability of the city to pay a
one per cent sales tax14 on materials used in a paving project,
a sewer, and a hospital, where the contractors agreed to furnish
all work and materials and were to be paid one lump sum price
for the completed work. The state auditor's construction was
that the city was liable as the "consumer" under the law. The
court ruled that the contractors were the "consumers," and that
"the sale of materials by the dealer to the contractors was the
taxable transaction." Certainly this was a clear case under the
provisions of Section 2 of the act, which made it possible to
determine the matter without a refusal to pay and a suit for
penalities.55
In Vinceut Realty Co. v. Brown, the trial court declared a
statute unconsTitutional which gave the state and its political
subdivision a lien for taxes against the assets of corporations.
This ruling was reversed, the supreme court holding that the
plaintiff showed no "present interest" in the determination of
the validity of the statute because it had no delinquent taxes and
showed no transfer, or possibility of a transfer, of assets in
51. (1937) 300 U. S. 227. See also Annotations: (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1230;
(1937) 108 A. L. R. 1009.
52. 16 Am. Jur. 315.
53. (1938) 342 Mo. 317, 114 S. W. (2d) 1017.
54. Mo. Laws of 1935, 411.
55. Other recent cases within this enumeration are Vincent Realty Co.
v. Brown (1939) 344 Mo. 438, 126 S. W. (2d) 1162; Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Jones (1939) 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d) 945, 125 A. L. R. 1149;
Smith v. Pettis County (1940) 345 Mo. 839, 136 S. W. (2d) 282; Maxwell
v. Andrew County (Mo. 1940) 146 S. W. (2d) 621.
56. Mo. Laws of 1937, 208, sec. 4598a.
19411
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violation of the statute. However, in so ruling the supreme court
did construe the statute by holding that "the lien declared * :1: *
does not attach until the corporation makes a sale or gift of the
whole or major part of its assets, at which time the lien must be
discharged before a valid transfer can be effected."5 7 This con-
struction disposed of the contention that the statutory lien was
a cloud on title preventing usual and ordinary sales of assets.
A very complete declaratory judgment was ordered in Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones,5 8 after the trial court had dismissed the
petition for declaratory judgment and granted affirmative equi-
table relief to defendants on their cross bill. This case not only
involved construction of statutes and determination of their ef-
fect upon the rights of insurance companies to use lay employees
instead of lawyers in certain transactions; but also the effect of
supreme court rules regulating the practice of law upon such
transactions and their construction and enforcement by the
Court's Bar Committees. This decision would, by analogy, seem
to authorize determination of the extent of authority of adminis-
trative tribunals to make and enforce certain regulations, as
would also Currin v. Wallace.9 Both Smith v. Pettis County0
and Maxwell v. Andrew County'1 are cases of county officers
seeking a determination of their rights to fees or compensation,
requiring construction of statutes. The Smith case particularly
illustrates how the remedy of declaratory judgment has made
it possible for one, who desires only to have what is rightfully
his, to obtain a determination of a complicated and ambiguously
worded statute without incurring public misunderstanding of
his position and consequent ill feeling which would be likely to
result if the question could only be decided by suit against him
after refusal to pay over alleged excess fees collected.
Perhaps the situations described in Section 1129, R. S. Mo.
1939 are those in which declaratory judgment will be used most.
Of course, as already noted, declaratory judgments (although
not heretofore so designated) have long been used in will con-
struction and trust cases. The recent case of State ex rel. Clay
57. Vincent Realty Co. v. Brown (1939) 344 Mo, 438, 126 S. W. (2d)
1162, 1163.
58. (1939) 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d) 945, 125 A. L. R. 1149.
59. (1939) 306 U. S. 1.
60. (1940) 345 Mo. 839, 136 S. W. (2d) 282.
61. (Mo. 1940) 146 S. W. (2d) 621.
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County Bank v. Waltner 2 involved the creation of an inter
vivos trust in personal property by delivery thereof with oral
directions. Title to this property, right to reduce it to cash,
right to distribute the proceeds, and claims of administrators
of the trustor's estate, of the executor of his widow's estate and
of their heirs were all involved. The court pointed out that
"jurisdiction over trusts is one of equity's original and inherent
powers" and that "when necessary to complete relief in a par-
ticular case a court of equity may not only construe the trust
but will aid in the discovery of trust funds." The court also
pointed out that full, complete and adequate relief for disposition
of all issues raised could not be had in the probate court nor in
any of the other separate actions suggested. This case demon-
strates not only how all of the broad powers of equity can be
used in connection with declaratory judgment relief to settle
many issues in one action (instead of requiring the expense and
delay of several), but also how this action can bring these mat-
ters before the court for such determination at an earlier stage
in the development of the controversy than was heretofore pos-
sible. Another wide field for future development and use of
declaratory judgments is in the construction of contracts and
rights, status, and relations thereunder. This is provided for
specifically by Section 1127, R. S. Mo. 1939, and Section 1128,
R. S. Mo. 1939. The latter section provides that "a contract may
be construed either before or after a breach thereof." This makes
it plain that a declaratory judgment may be had at the time when
it is likely to do the parties the most good; namely, before
damage has been sustained by either and before either is re-
quired to take a position which would inevitably result in dam-
age. Such contract cases have not yet come to the appellate
courts of Missouri. "In England during the World War numer-
ous declaratory judgments were rendered as to the effect of the
war upon various contracts."'' 3 Perhaps that is a development to
be expected from our present national defense activities and
their aftermath. In this connection it is well to consider, as
pointed out in Manchester v. Townshend,64 that since we have
adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, decisions of
62. (Mo. 1940) 145 S. W. (2d) 152.
63. 16 Am. Jur. 306.
64. (1937) 109 Vt. 65, 192 AtI. 22, 110 A. L. R. 811.
1941]
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the highest courts of other states having like acts will have more
authority as precedents than is usually true of decisions in other
jurisdictions.
B. Limitations upon use.
Declaratory judgment is not a remedy to reopen cases which
have gone to final judgment or to make a collateral attack on
a judgment valid on the face of the record. In State ex rel.
Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Terte, 5 it was sought to obtain a
judgment declaring plaintiff to be the wife of an employee of a
Missouri corporation and entitled as such to make claim under
the workmen's compensation act, in spite of a Kansas divorce
which under the allegations of the petition was voidable but not
absolutely void on its face. It was held that the act "may not be
invoked to test the validity of a judgment roll, admittedly valid
and regular on its face, of a competent court, in an action against
a stranger to the record of said judgment." The court further
said that the "Declaratory Judgment Act was not intended as
a substitute for a new trial or an appeal or review proceedings."
In a somewhat similar case, Ferree v. Ferree,6 declaration was
sought that a divorce was void on the ground that it was ob-
tained by the wife while the husband was confined in the peniten-
tiary. The court held that "an action will not lie under the
Declaratory Judgment Act to determine the propriety of a judg-
ment in a prior action between the same parties." The court
pointed out that if such an action was allowed, then "an action
would lie under the Declaratory Judgment Act to determine
whether the judgment passing upon the validity of a prior judg-
ment was proper and there would be no end to that kind of
litigation." Of course, it is clearly a different situation, if a
judgment void on the face of the record is involved.A1 Removal
of such judgment, by decree, as a cloud on title, is one of the
oldest antecedents of declaratory judgments.
Comment upon the limitations as to moot questions and ad-
visory opinions has already been made. 8 Section 6 of the act"
specifically provides a broad limitation; namely, "The court may
refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where
65. (1939) 345 Mo. 95, 131 S. W. (2d) 587.
66. (1938) 273 Ky. 238, 115 S. W. (2d) 1055.
67. See Hankins v. Smarr (1940) 345 Mo. 973, 137 S. W. (2d) 499.
68. Part III B hereof.
69. Now R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1131.
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such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the pro-
ceeding." Undoubtedly the purpose of this section is to give the
court some discretion to determine, in border line cases, whether
the situation has reached the stage where a declaratory judgment
would really be final. If it would not actually settle the con-
troversy because future developments might reasonably be ex-
pected to raise more or different questions, the court could prop-
erly refuse a declaration. However, this discretion should not be
too strictly or narrowly exercised. The act itself declares that it
is remedial; and that "its purpose is to settle and to afford relief
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status
and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and
administered."'
While both the uniform and federal acts make it clear that a
declaratory judgment should not be denied merely because there
are disputed questions of fact between the parties, nevertheless
some courts have shown a tendency to refuse to make a declara-
tion upon a case which essentially depends upon determination
of disputed facts, "especially where the disputed questions of
fact will be the subject of judicial investigation in a regular
action."',, This seems to be on the theory that the principal
purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to make declarations
of rights, status and other legal relations, which could not be
made before its enactment, and not primarily to determine or try
issues which could prior to that time be tried and settled in other
actions . 2 Perhaps a fair statement of this view would be that
declaratory relief is proper in disputed fact cases when determi-
nation of disputed fact issues is merely incidental to the main
purpose of declaring rights, status or other legal relations.
There is, however, good authority for a broader view. Pro-
fessor Borchard argues that the uniform act authorizes the
broader view, since the statute "provides that 'whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed,' i. e., whether a coercive
remedy like damages, injunction or specific performance (1) is
70. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1137.
71. 16 Am. Jur. 294. See also Transport Oil Co. v. Bush (1931) 114
Cal. App. 152, 1 P. (2d) 1060; Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore(1930) 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618, 68 A. L. R. 106; Heller v. Shapiro
(1932) 208 Wis. 310, 242 N. W. 174, 87 A. L. R. 1201.
72. See Annotation (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1211.
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also claimed, (2) could be claimed but is not claimed, or (3)
could not be claimed, the declaratory judgment may not on that
ground be denied. 7 3 The New York Court of Appeals recognized
in Woolard v. Schaffer Stores Co.7 4 that "while resort to the use
of a declaratory judgment is usually unnecessary where an ade-
quate remedy is already provided by another form of action 'no
limitation has been placed upon its use.'" The court therein
held that the trial court could "exercise its discretion in refusing
to proceed to a declaratory judgment when other remedies are
adequate" and should do so whenever "another action between
the same parties, in which all issues could be determined is
actually pending;" but that it is not bound to do so "solely for
the reason that another remedy is available." This broader view
has been taken in cases under the federal act.7 5 The recent case
of State ex rel. Clay County Bank v. Waltner0 is also substantial
authority for the broader view. It is apparent that this case in-
volved many fact issues to be determined on oral testimony. The
court wisely refused the contentions that the main disputed is-
sues should be settled in a proceeding to discover assets or in
any of the other separate actions suggested. It would seem un-
necessary and unwise to limit the scope of declaratory judgment
relief merely because it is necessary to make findings of fact, or
because there are other actions in which such issues could be
settled. Whether or not other remedies are as full, complete and
adequate ought to be the soundest basis for determining whether
or not a declaratory judgment proceeding should be allowed.
V. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. Parties.
The act provides that "all persons shall be made parties who
have or claim any interest which would be affected by the decla-
ration," and that "no declaration shall prejudice the rights of
persons not parties to the proceeding. '" 77 This has been recently
held to mean "that all persons should be made parties who have
73. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1939) 9 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 6
Current Legal Thought 59.
74. (1936) 272 N. Y. 304, 5 N. E. (2d) 829.
75. Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins (App. D. C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 627;
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts (C. C. A. 4, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 665;
Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (C. C. A. 4, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 406.
76. (Mo. 1940) 145 S. W. (2d) 152.
77. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1136.
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'any right or interest in the subject or object of the suit' as in
an equity case.78 The rule as to necessary parties could hardly
be better stated than in the rule of the Scottish Courts (herein-
above stated) that there must at least be as a party "a proper
contradicter," namely: "Someone presently existing, who has a
true interest to oppose the declaration sought."79 The act defines
the word "person" to mean "any person (including a minor
represented by next friend or guardian ad litem, and any other
person under disability lawfully represented), partnership, joint
stock company, corporation, unincorporated association or so-
ciety or municipal or other corporation of any character what-
soever"14 ° However, how to get an unincorporated association
into court under the present state of the law in Missouri is
another problem.-1
Another specific provision of the act as to parties is that "in
any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordi-
nance or franchise such municipality shall be made a party and
shall be entitled to be heard ;" and that "if the statute, ordinance
or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney
General of the state shall also be served with a copy of the pro-
ceeding and shall be entitled to be heard."8 2 This does not specifi-
cally require the Attorney General to be made a party, but that
would certainly be proper practice. This was done in School
District of Kansas City v. Smith.8 3 In that case (the State
Auditor and Attorney General being made parties) it was held
that the seller of goods was not a necessary party to an action
to determine the constitutionality of a sales tax statute84 where
"the purchaser is taxpayer, and the seller, although responsible,
is an agent or conduit" for collection. Thus the real party to the
controversy, the purchaser, was entitled to bring the action
against the collecting officer and the Attorney General. The re-
quirement as to notice to the Attorney General recognizes the
78. State ex rel. Clay County Bank v. Waltner (Mo. 1940) 145 S. W.
(2d) 152.
79. Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. British Bank (1921) 90
L. J. K. B. N. S. 1089, 19 A. L. R. 1101.
80. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1138.
81. Ruggles v. International Ass'n (1932) 331 Mo. 20, 52 S. W. (2d)
860; Newton County Exchange v. Kansas City Southern Ry. (1930) 326
Mo. 617, 31 S. W. (2d) 803.
82. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1136.
83. (1937) 342 Mo. 21, 111 S. W. (2d) 167.
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interest of the state in the determination of the constitutionality
of many statutes.
B. Pleadings.
Pleadings in declaratory judgment cases, of course, must be
governed by general code provisions. In Maxwell v. Andrew
County8' it was held proper to order a reference, under general
code provisions, where defendant's answer (to plaintiff's declara-
tory judgment petition) contained a counterclaim presenting a
disputed long account. In Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones6 it
was held that "there is no procedural reason why such an action
may not be heard with a crQss action for affirmative equitable
relief." In the Liberty Mutual case, the appellate court decided
constitutional questions raised in the petition for a declaratory
judgment, although the trial court had dismissed plaintiff's peti-
tion and decided the case on defendant's crossbill. In State ex
,rel. Clay County Bank v. Waltner87 it was held that the petition
stated sufficient facts to show that the creation, enforcement,
administration and distribution of a trust was involved so as to
come within the terms of R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1129. It 'was also
held therein that the statement as to all these matter did not con-
stitute a misjoinder of separate causes of action to determine
title to certain certificates (claimed to be part of the trust res),
to enforce their payment, and to partition them. However,
joinder of separate independent and distinct controversies
against parties who do not have either joint interest or liability
has been and no doubt should be refused. 8 Certainly the pro-
visions of our present code would govern the matter of joinder of
actions generally in declaratory judgment cases as in all others.
It certainly seems reasonable to believe that under our code,
separate counts (or counterclaims or cross bills) for other relief
could be joined in the same petition (or answer) with a count
for a declaratory judgment. Of course joinder of counts which
are not inconsistent has always been authorized by our code.,,
A good precedent for this, in declaratory judgment cases, would
be the established practice of joining with a count for quiet title
84. Mo. Laws of 1935, 411-426.
85. (Mo. 1940) 146 S. W. (2d) 621.
86. (1939) 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d) 945.
87. (Mo. 1940) 145 S. W. (2d) 152.
88. See Annotations: (1937) 110 A. L. R. 817; (1925) 41 A. L. R. 1223.
89. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 917.
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(in effect a declaratory judgment) a count in ejectment (coercive
relief) 90 and which authorizes also ancillary relief in aid thereof,
like receivership.91 In State ex rel. Public Service Commission
v. Blair92 it was contended "that the Declaratory Judgment Act
does not authorize injunctive relief without a new proceeding."
However, this contention was abandoned and therefore was not
specifically decided, but the court commented that "the petition
* * * makes a case for injunctive relief without regard to the
Declaratory Judgment Act." It might be suggested that it should
make no difference whether or not the declaratory judgment act
specifically authorizes joinder of counts or requests for coercive
or ancillary relief, if the general code of which that act is now
a part does, by reasonable construction, authorize it.
C. Affirmative relief sought by defendant.
Undoubtedly a declaratory judgment action, like any other
action, could be brought in by answer and cross bill.9 3 It has
been suggested that the cross bill could be used even in tort cases,
to prevent the plaintiff from avoiding a final determination of
the case by taking a nonsuit.94 This course has been used in
patent cases to obtain an adjudication on the validity of a patent
or on the question of infringement. 95 Likewise, a defendant in
a declaratory judgment case may by counterclaim or cross bill
seek other affirmative relief." Since the act contains no pro-
visions as to pleading, except as to "further relief based on a
declaratory judgment,"97 the provisions of our general code must
apply. Of course under it, the defendant in any case may seek
any appropriate affirmative relief.
D. Trial.
The only provision of the act concerning trial of issues is
Section 9.98 It provides: "When a proceeding under this article
90. Kimberlin v. Roberts (1937) 341 Mo. 267, 107 S. W. (2d) 24.
91. Ebbs v. Neff (1930) 325 Mo. 1182, 30 S. W. (2d) 616.
92. (Mo. 1940) 146 S. W. (2d) 865, 868.
93. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 928 & 929.
94. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1939) 9 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1,
6 Current Legal Thought 59.
95. Edelman & Co. v. Triple A Specialty Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1937) 88 F.
(2d) 852.
96. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones (1939) 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d)
945; Maxwell v. Andrew County (Mo. 1940) 146 S. W. (2d) 621.
97. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1133.
98. Id. at sec. 1134.
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involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be
tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are
tried and determined in other civil actions in the court in which
the proceeding is pending." The federal act provides that "when
a declaration of right or the granting of further relief based
thereon shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable
by a jury, such issues may be submitted to a jury in the form of
interrogatories, with proper instructions by the court, whether
a general verdict be required or not."99 In Maxwell v. Andrew
Countyo° it was held that a trial before a referee was properly
ordered where the defendant in a declaratory judgment case filed
a counterclaim involving a long account. Because of the equitable
background of the remedy, it would seem to be within the prov-
ince of the court to make findings of fact in most cases. Where
it is desired to have a jury, it would seem more reasonable to
have fact issues separately submitted to the jury without a
general verdict. Such a jury determination could undoubtedly
be ordered where requested by both parties or at the discretion
of the judge. Certainly there is nothing in the uniform act to
prohibit such practice. It would, in fact, seem to be authorized
by our present civil code. Section 1120, R. S. Mo. (1939) (long
in our general code) only requires general verdicts on issues "for
the recovery of money only, or specific real or personal prop-
erty." Section 1121, R. S. Mo. (1939) directly authorizes special
verdicts "in all other cases, if * * * in the opinion of the court
* * * necessary to determine any fact in controversy by the ver-
dict of a jury." This would seem to be the better practice in
declaratory judgment cases, and a good place to develop its use.1*'
In fact, it seems difficult to see how a general verdict could be
satisfactory, because the declaration would always involve ques-
tions of law whether the facts were conceded or found by a jury
verdict. To use the vernacular, declaratory judgment action
seems to be "a natural" for use of special verdict practice.
E. Judgment or decree.
Whether a declaratory judgment action is decided for or
against the plaintiff, there should be a declaration in the judg-
99. (1935) 49 Stat. 955, 1027, 28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 400. See
also Federal Rules 57, 38 and 39, 28 U. S. C. A., following sec. 723c.
100. (Mo. 1940) 146 S. W. (2d) 621.
101. See Hyde, Fact Finding by Special Verdict (1941) 24 Journal of
Am. Judicature Soc. 144.
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ment or decree defining the rights of the parties under the issues
made.1 102 In a case where grounds for declaratory judgment are
shown, it is not proper practice merely to enter a judgment that
the losing party takes nothing by his petition or counterclaim;
or usually to sustain a demurrer and enter a judgment of dis-
missal.1"3 Section 1 of the act specifically provides that "the
declaration may be either affirmative or negative."'' 0 Therefore,
no difficulty should be presented in preparation of a judgment
either for or against the claims made in the petition. Of course,
if no proper case for declaratory judgment is presented, as in
Vincent Realty Co. v. Brown,,' in case of a petition seeking an
advisory opinion concerning future prospective action, it is
proper to enter judgment dismissing the petition.
F. Granting Declaratory Relief Sua Sponte.
If plaintiff in any ordinary action is not entitled to damages
or coercive relief sought, but could have maintained a declara-
tory judgment action on the facts shown, should the court sua
sponte grant a declaration of rights? Hasselbrink v. Koepke0 8
is authority that this may be done. There an action, as com-
menced, sought to enjoin interference with a claimed easement.
The court found the evidence insufficient to authorize either in-
junction or award of damages. (It was shown that the easement
had no present practical use to plaintiffs but would have a future
value when they extended their building.) The court held that
"plaintiffs' bill of complaint should not be dismissed but sus-
tained, and a declaration of rights made upon the principle that
plaintiffs acquired for a valuable consideration legal rights by
deed, and are entitled to have those rights determined, declared
and protected" so that they would be entitled, "when they desire
to make use of it (the easement), to have such use."'10 7 No doubt
situations will arise where a party has misconceived his remedy
but in which a declaratory judgment might settle the controversy.
This action by the court might save the expense and delay of
further proceedings, and should be granted if the party entitled
to it so desires.
102. Smith v. Pettis County (1940) 345 Mo. 839, 136 S. W. (2d) 282.
103. Frazier v. Chattanooga (1928) 156 Tenn. 346, 1 S. W. (2d) 786. As
to action of appellate court in such situation see Part VI hereof.
104. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1126.
105. (1939) 344 Mo. 438, 126 S. W. (2d) 1162.
106. (1933) 263 Mich. 466, 248 N. W. 869.
107. Ibid. 248 N. W. at 874.
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G. Enforcement of Rights and Other Relief after Judgment.
The act (sec. 8) provides that "further relief based on a decla-
ratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary
or proper."'" 8 This section also provides for application therefor
"by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief ;"
and that such court "shall, on reasonable notice, require any ad-
verse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declara-
tory judgment or decree, to show cause why such further relief
should not be granted forthwith." There has been some disagree-
ment concerning the effect of such a provision. A narrow view
was taken in Brindley v. Meara"° that such "further relief"
must be interpreted as referring to additional declaratory relief.
An annotation following this case 10 shows that this view is not
in accord with the weight of authority. This would hardly seem
to be the intent of the above provision of the uniform act. A
supplemental petition, in the same case, after declaratory judg-
ment, for coercive or ancillary relief, at least before the case has
been finally terminated so that the court had not lost its juris-
diction of the case, or a later independent action, would not seem
to be out of harmony with our established procedure."' Un-
doubtedly it is necessary to have a remedy to enforce declared
rights (again like ejectment in case of quiet title) if such rights
are disregarded.
VI. APPELLATE REVIEW
A declaratory judgment is an appealable judgment because
section 1 of the act provides that its "declarations shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.""12 Section 7 of
the act provides: "All orders, judgments and decrees under this
Act may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.""' 3
In the case of School District of Kansas City v. Smith,14 the
court refused "to determine the applicability or non-applicability
(of a sales tax statute) to the facts alleged in the petition" where
it reversed the action of the trial court in sustaining a demurrer.
In that situation, because the appellate court did not have all the
108. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1133.
109. (1935) 209 Ind. 260, 198 N. E. 301, 101 A. L. R. 682.
110. (1935) 101 A. L. R. 689.
111. Mills v. Metropolitan Street By. (1920) 282 Mo. 118, 221 S. W. 1.
112. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1126.
113. Id. at sec. 1132.
114. (1937) 342 Mo. 21, 111 S. W. (2d) 167.
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facts, it remanded the case. The parties then had the right to
make their proof. It has since been held that when the trial
court fails to make declarations in its judgment settling the
rights of the parties, the supreme court will do so under a statute
authorizing it to "give such judgment as such court ought to
have given. '", 1,- Smith v. Pettis County and Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Jones were before the appellate court on the facts (proved
or conceded) and a declaratory decree was directed, after the
trial court had dismissed the declaratory judgment petition, with-
out a declaration. This procedure was also approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Currin v. Wallace""' where a
Circuit Court of Appeals's decree1"T entered after dismissal in
the trial court, was affirmed. Certainly it is best that cases should
be finally settled by being reversed and remanded with directions
to enter a final decree whenever the record makes such a dis-
position possible.'-
The question arises as to whether the equity rule of review
applies in declaratory judgment cases. Of course, in many cases
this would make no difference, because there would be no dispute
about facts. For example, often in the construction of contracts,
wills, and other written instruments only legal questions would
be presented for decision. This would also be true where a case
is presented upon an agreed statement of facts. The Declaratory
Judgments Act only provides that a fact issue "may be tried and
determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and
determined in other civil actions in the court in which the pro-
ceeding is pending."1"9 What does that mean in a state which
does not have separate courts of law and equity? If a declaratory
judgment proceeding is sui generis with an equitable historical
affinity, why would not the analogy of divorce proceedings be
applicable? In State ex rel. Couplin v. Hostetter,20 the court
held that "divorce and alimony is a proceeding sui generis
founded on statute, not purely a common law or equitable pro-
115. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1229. Smith v. Pettis County (1940) 345 Mo.
839, 136 S. W. (2d) 282. See also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones (1939)
344 Mo. 932, 130 S. W. (2d) 945, 125 A. L. R. 1149.
116. (1939) 306 U. S. 1.
117. Wallace v. Currin (C. C. A. 4, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 856.
118. See St. Louis Amusement Co. v. St. Louis County (Mo. 1941) 147
S. W. (2d) 667.
119. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 1134.
120. (1939) 344 Mo. 770, 129 S. W. (2d) 1.
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ceeding, but having qualities of both; that it has "a practice
similar to equity;" and that "an appellate court determines the
case de novo and is not bound by the findings of the court below,
but may make a different finding of its own." This has always
been the rule of appellate review in this state in divorce cases.
The modern tendency, of course, is to combine law and equity
and to get away from the distinctions which have only an his-
torical and not a reasonable basis. The new federal rules make
the equity rule apply to findings of fact in all cases tried without
a jury.' 1 Is there any good reason why findings of fact, at least
those not submitted to a jury but made by the trial court, should
not be subject to the equity rule of review? And, if the equity
rule applies completely, as in divorce cases, are not even those
made by a jury only advisory ?122 A different rule has, however,
been adopted under the Federal act ;123 namely, would it be a law
case if the parties were reversed and a usual action brought.
VII. CONCLUSION
The new complex relations of modern commerce and industry
have made necessary better judicial methods for determination
of controversies arising from such relations. Modern business
moves at a swift pace. It is increasingly important not only to
have controversies decided right but also at the right time. Too
often old, inadequate or obstructive methods of procedure have
resulted in such slow motion justice that rights have sometimes
been established only after they had become valueless because of
changed conditions. The movement to reform procedure, by
elimination of many former means for delaying or evading a
trial on the merits, showed important results in the adoption of
the new federal rules. Many state procedural codes are being
revised in accordance with this model. However, something more
than speedier procedure is needed to solve many of the compli-
cated questions of modern relations at the time they need to be
decided. Better procedure can hasten determination of what are
the effects or consequences of action taken or failure to take ac-
121. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proceedings of American Bar
Association Institute (Cleveland, 1938) 312 et seq. (Statement of William
D. Mitchell, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the U. S. Supreme
Court on Rules of Civil Procedure).
122. See Shaw v. Butler (Mo. 1934) 78 S. W. (2d) 420.
123. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald (C. C. A. 9, 1939) 107 F. (2d)
446.
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tion. But the crying need is sometimes to know what a person
has a right to do, or whether it would be improper, perhaps dis-
astrous, for him to take contemplated action, in situations already
completely developed, or to know what rights others have already
have against him. It is these situations (and they are many) for
which the new idea of declaratory judgments provides the rem-
edy. Lawyers undoubtedly will increasingly find in it better
means for satisfactorily serving the interests of their clients. If
they do, it is very likely that they will find increased demand for
their services.
The old idea of the common law was to limit judgments to
redress of wrongs and thus make litigation only a curative pro-
cess. Declaratory judgments provide a means for preventive
justice. As in preventive medicine, it may be possible to prevent
great loss or damage by knowing, in time, what to do and what
not to do. One complaint laymen frequently make about both
lawyers and courts is that they tell you only what is wrong, and
will not tell you what is right; what you cannot do, instead of
what you can do. Now by use of declaratory judgments it is
possible, in many instances, to find out what is right, as a guide
for action. Where a declaratory judgment can be used, the law-
yer does not have to guess at what to advise his client; in such
situations he can find out. Of course, this remedy has decided
limitations. It cannot decide an immediate course of action when
decisions cannot wait for a court hearing. It cannot give advice
about future events which may or may not occur. However,
proper cooperation of courts and lawyers can broaden the scope
of its usefulness. Decided cases certainly show many situations
in which it has functioned adequately in a very helpful way. A
civilized concept of the function of courts surely would not limit
them from assisting in the determination of controversies until
after these had resulted in a wrongful injury to or invasion of
the rights of one of the parties. It is indeed fortunate for Mis-
souri lawyers and their clients that the courts of this state will
not be so limited in the future.
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